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With the globalization of economy and the rapid development of IPR, the great 
changes of standardization mode in technical field are taking place. Standardization 
would help to prompt the integrated market and improve consumers’ welfare. 
Meanwhile,standard can provide both positive benefits and negative effects at the 
same time.The positive benefits are obvious for guaranteeing quality and 
compatibility of production and promoting technology innovation. The negative 
effects would be abusing IP rights,limiting the choices consumers have and inhibiting 
innovation. 
Vast majority of standardzing organizations dopt the dotrine called 
FRAND,which is Fair,Reasonable and Non-discriminatory. This dotrine is good for 
balancing respective interests and widely applied nowadays. However,this dotrine is 
unclear in its intension and lacking of operability. For instance,the obscure concept of 
fair and reasonable.Besides it is difficult to distinguish discriminatory price and 
reasonable price variance. That is the reason why each enforcement authorities dealt 
cases differently and seemingly unguided. 
Under such circumstances ,the dotrine of Smallest Salable Patent-practicing Unit 
comes to appear. This dotrine is conductive to confirm the reasonable royalty by 
determing the base of royalty. As such NDRC quoted this dotrine to confirm the 
royalty of Qualcomm’s standard essential patent. 
This essay suggests that empowering the standardzing organizations to consider 
preliminarily throughout whole process of standard essential patent negotiation. 
Besides, this essay also suggests that by testing its relationship to product functions, 
the contribution to its value,the substitutability of relevant market and the dominant 
position to identify the smallest salable patent-practicing unit. It is a good approach to 
promote the Antitrust enforcements’ ability and seek a balance between patentees’ 
IPR and social welfare. Furthermore,this dotrine will exploit standards’s advantages 
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引  言 
 1 
引  言 










缺陷。“最小可销售单位”原则正是在这样的背景之下产生的。在 2015 年 2 月
结束的国家发展改革委员会对高通反垄断执法案中，反垄断执法机构的报告中出




























































































































行了研究，主要有：Janice M. Muelller 认为 FRAND 原则内涵的不确定性在于不
同的案件有不同的背景、诉由，合理、公平、无歧视原则的灵活性赋予法官的自













国司法部早前在答复 IEEE（电气电子工程师协会）的 Business Review Letter（《业
务审查函》）的第二点就合理许可费率（Reasonable Rate）的含义进行了明确的




④ Janice M. Muelller,Patenting Industry Standards,J.Marshall L. Rev,2001,34,p.897. 



































































全球芯片产业的最大供应商。高通所拥有的 1400 余项手机专利技术覆盖 3G、4G
领域，其掌握的无线通讯领域技术成为相关手机制造产业进入市场的必备要素之
一。以 2013 年的 Q3 全球基带芯片领域市场占有量为例，高通占有率高达 66%，
而位居第二的联发科（MTK）以及第三位的英特尔（Intel）市场占有率之和也不
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